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THE UNSETTLED NATURE OF THE UNION 
Carlos M. Vázquez∗ 
In The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union,1 Profes-
sor Bradford Clark makes a narrow claim and a broad claim about the 
Founders’ understanding of the nature of the Union they were creat-
ing.  The narrow claim is that the Founders understood that the feder-
al obligations of the states would be enforced in court in suits against 
individual state officers rather than the states themselves.  The broad 
claim is that the Founders understood that the federal government 
would lack the power to impose obligations on the states as states.  
Clark’s narrow claim is important and well supported, though not en-
tirely novel.  The broad claim is novel insofar as it would place limita-
tions on the federal legislative power beyond those already recognized 
in cases such as New York v. United States2 and Printz v. United 
States,3 but Clark’s argument for it is not entirely convincing.  Most of 
the evidence that he musters for the broad claim could be read to sup-
port the narrower claim instead. 
Clark’s article is framed as a defense of a literal interpretation of 
the Eleventh Amendment.4  One of the few propositions on which crit-
ics and defenders of the Court’s current Eleventh Amendment juri-
sprudence agree is that a literal interpretation makes no sense.  Why 
bar suits against states when brought by citizens of other states or of 
foreign states but permit such suits when brought by the state’s own 
citizens?  Defenders of the Court’s current Eleventh Amendment juris-
prudence argue that the amendment’s text is underinclusive, while 
critics argue that the text is overinclusive.  Either the amendment bars 
suits against the states when brought by in-state plaintiffs, as the Su-
preme Court held in Hans v. Louisiana,5 or it permits such suits even 
when brought by out-of-state plaintiffs, as Hans’s critics argue. 
Clark maintains that it did make sense to the amendment’s framers 
to exclude only suits by out-of-state plaintiffs.  Under Article III, the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 * Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  I am grateful for comments from 
Bradford Clark, Vicki Jackson, and Stephen Vladeck. 
 1 Bradford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 1817 (2010). 
 2 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 3 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 4 The Amendment provides in full that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. XI. 
 5 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
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federal courts could have jurisdiction over suits against the states by 
in-state plaintiffs only if the suits arose under federal law, and Clark 
argues that the Framers established a Union in which there would not 
be any suits against states arising under federal law.  If so, then suits 
against states could fall within Article III only if brought by out-of-
state plaintiffs under the diversity provision of Article III, which the 
Supreme Court had construed in Chisholm v. Georgia6 to permit such 
suits.  If the amendment’s purpose was to ensure that states could not 
be sued in federal courts at all, then it did make sense to limit the 
amendment’s reach to cases covered by the diversity provision. 
According to Clark, the Founders assumed that there would be no 
cases against states arising under federal law because they understood 
that the Union they were establishing was one in which (a) the obliga-
tions imposed on the states by the Constitution would be enforced only 
through suits between individuals, including suits against individual 
state officers, and (b) the federal government would lack the power to 
impose additional obligations on the states by statute.  To the extent 
that Clark seeks to defend a textual reading of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, his second, more controversial point adds nothing to his first, 
less novel point.  If followed today, however, the second claim would 
significantly contract Congress’s substantive legislative powers. 
But the evidence that Clark offers in support of the second claim is 
equivocal.  Most of the statements of the Framers that he cites in sup-
port of the broader claim can be understood to support instead the 
first, narrower claim.  In other words, rather than saying that the fed-
eral government lacked the power to enact laws operative on states, 
the Framers were likely saying only that the federal government 
lacked the power to enforce the federal obligations of the states 
through coercive suits against the states themselves.  This would leave 
Congress with the power to enact laws operative on states and to pro-
vide for the enforcement of such laws in suits between individuals (in-
cluding state officers). 
I.  CLARK’S NARROWER POINT 
As Clark acknowledges, the Constitution itself imposes obligations 
on the states as states.  For example, it prohibits states from enacting 
ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, or from impairing the obligation 
of contracts.7  As Clark notes, it is well established that these and oth-
er constitutional obligations of the states can be enforced in suits 
against individual state officers.8  Indeed, it is a commonplace that our 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 8 Clark, supra note 1, at 1851. 
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Constitution establishes an officer-liability regime, rather than a gov-
ernment-liability regime.9  Most commentators who have made this 
point have done so in describing the Supreme Court’s post-Hans Elev-
enth Amendment jurisprudence.  It has been less often noted that this 
officer-liability regime appears to have been intended by the Framers, 
but, as Clark recognizes, I made this point in 1997.  Relying on some 
of the same sources cited by Clark, I noted then that 
[t]here is . . . significant support in the statements of the Framers of the 
original Constitution for the proposition that they contemplated that the 
obligations of the state governments would be enforced in court by means 
of suits against state officials, not against the states themselves.  After dis-
cussing the methods by which the Constitution would provide for the effi-
cacy of federal obligations, the Founders decided not to retain the scheme 
set up by the Articles of Confederation, under which federal norms were 
enforceable only against the states as political bodies. . . . The Founders 
rejected the prevalent system because they believed that duties could be 
enforced against political bodies only through military force.  Against in-
dividuals, by contrast, duties could be enforced through the courts . . . .10 
My point was that the Framers’ understanding that the constitu-
tional obligations of states could be enforced in suits against state offi-
cials shows that sovereign immunity is not incompatible with judicial 
enforcement of the substantive legal obligations of government.11  The 
Framers’ experience under the Articles of Confederation taught them 
that the Constitution could not leave the efficacy of the states’ legal 
obligations to the good faith of the states.  Because they understood 
that the judicial power must be coextensive with the legislative, they 
would not have adopted a Constitution imposing legal obligations on 
the states while at the same time leaving states with an immunity that 
would have precluded judicial enforcement of such obligations.  Yet 
there is evidence that they embraced the doctrine of sovereign immuni-
ty.  The key to this puzzle, I argued, is the Framers’ understanding 
that the legal obligations of the states were to be enforced in suits 
against individual state officers rather than the states themselves.  
Clark’s article provides valuable additional support for this argument. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 9 See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 
VA. L. REV. 47 (1998); Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396 (1987). 
 10 Carlos Manuel Vázquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683, 
1780 (1997) (citing 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOP-
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 197  (photo. reprint 1987) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1888) 
[hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (statement of Oliver Ellsworth); William Samuel Johnson, 
Speech in the Connecticut Ratifying Convention (Jan. 4, 1788), in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 248–49 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. 
Saladino eds., 1984) [hereinafter DHRC]); cf. Clark, supra note 1, at 1856–57 (citing same sources). 
 11 See Vázquez, supra note 10, at 1689. 
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Whether the article sheds significant light on the Eleventh 
Amendment’s text, however, is debatable.  Clark succeeds in explain-
ing otherwise strange omissions from the text of the Eleventh Amend-
ment (principally, its failure to mention suits against states by their cit-
izens), but only by relying on propositions about the “nature of the 
Union” that themselves have no basis in the constitutional text.  His 
explanation is not much of an advance over the one proffered by the 
current Supreme Court majority, which is also based on the existence 
of a background assumption having no basis in the text — the states’ 
entitlement to sovereign immunity.12  Indeed, the two unwritten prop-
ositions would appear to be two sides of the same coin.  If the Found-
ers did assume that the constitutional obligations of the states would 
be enforceable only in suits against individuals, their assumption (and 
the resulting observations about the nature of the Union) would ap-
pear to have been grounded on the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  
Clark’s narrower claim thus does not offer insights into the Eleventh 
Amendment’s text that differ dramatically, if at all, from the view of 
the current Supreme Court majority.13 
II.  CLARK’S BROADER CLAIM 
In my 1997 piece, I argued that the Framers contemplated that the 
federal obligations imposed by Congress on the states would similarly 
be enforced in suits against state officials.  Clark argues instead that 
the Founders intended to deny the federal government altogether the 
power to impose obligations on the states by statute.  I consider 
Clark’s evidence for this broader proposition below.  But first, it is 
worth noting that Clark’s broader argument provides no additional 
ammunition for his defense of a textual reading of the Eleventh 
Amendment.  Without denying that the Constitution imposes obliga-
tions on states, Clark argues that a literal reading of the Eleventh 
Amendment would have made sense to the Framers if those obliga-
tions were enforceable only in officer suits.  The same would presum-
ably be true for the federal statutory obligations of the states.  Thus, 
Clark’s textual defense of the Eleventh Amendment derives all the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 12 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); and Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), 
where the majority dismissed arguments based on text on the ground that the Founders assumed 
the existence of a background principle of immunity. 
 13 In at least one respect, Clark’s narrower claim goes beyond current Eleventh Amendment 
doctrine.  Current doctrine permits suits against the states by the federal government.  The 
Founders’ statements on which the narrow claim is based do not distinguish between suits by in-
dividuals and suits by the federal government.  Indeed, some of these statements strongly suggest 
that the Founders did not envision coercion by the federal government against states (as distin-
guished from state officials).  Like Clark, I do not take a position on whether the Founders’ intent 
on this or other points should be followed today.  See Clark, supra note 1, at 1915–16. 
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support it gets from Clark’s analysis from the narrower proposition on 
which he and I agree.  Clark’s broader proposition, even if true, would 
shed no additional light on the Eleventh Amendment. 
On the other hand, Clark’s claim that the Founders intended to 
deny Congress the power to impose obligations on the states as states 
would, if followed today, significantly contract the federal legislative 
power.  The Supreme Court has already begun narrowing Congress’s 
power to legislate with respect to the states, relying on some of the 
sources cited by Clark (and relied upon by me in support of the nar-
rower point).  In New York v. United States, the Court cited some of 
these sources in holding that Congress lacks the power to commandeer 
state legislatures.14  But the Court in New York declined to overrule 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,15 in which it 
had upheld a federal minimum wage law insofar as it applied to state 
and local governments.  The Court in New York interpreted Garcia to 
stand for the proposition that Congress may regulate the states as part 
of a broader group that includes private parties.16  If Clark’s analysis 
is correct, then Garcia conflicts with the Founders’ understanding of 
the nature of our Union.17 
In my 1997 article, I argued that the Supreme Court was mistaken 
in New York to read these sources as authority to limit Congress’s 
power to impose obligations on the states.  After all, the Constitution 
itself places obligations on the states, so “[i]t is . . . difficult to interpret 
these statements as contemplating that there would be no federal obli-
gations operative on states as political bodies.”18  Instead, I argued: 
The Framers’ statements are best taken as statements about remedies and 
enforcement, not the existence vel non of legal obligations.  The Framers’ 
concerns support the conclusion that the federal obligations of the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 14 505 U.S. 144, 165–66 (1992) (citing 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 197; 4 id. at 
256; 2 id. at 56; 2 id. at 233; 4 id. at 153). 
 15 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 16 New York, 505 U.S. at 160. 
 17 Clark remains agnostic on whether the Court should reverse Garcia, see Clark, supra note 1, 
at 1915–16, but presumably he has bothered to make the argument because he believes that such 
a move would be consistent with the Framers’ intent.  Although Clark is generally agnostic re-
garding the present-day doctrinal implications of his argument, he does maintain that his argu-
ment supports the Court’s current doctrine permitting abrogation of state sovereign immunity 
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment but not pursuant to antecedent provisions of the Consti-
tution, such as the Commerce Clause.  See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57–73 (1996).  
Clark argues that the changes in the nature of our Union wrought by the Civil War justify this 
distinction.  Clark, supra note 1, at 1909.  In my view, Clark’s agnosticism should extend to this 
issue as well.  See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 859, 893 (2000) (noting that changes wrought by Civil War could conceivably jus-
tify an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as retroactively broadening the federal gov-
ernment’s power to authorize suits by individuals against states under antecedent constitutional 
provisions). 
 18 Vázquez, supra note 10, at 1781. 
VAZQUEZ - BOOKPROOFS - FINAL-3.DOC 02/23/11 – 11:13 AM 
84 HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 123:79 
states — those imposed by the Constitution and those imposed on the 
states by Congress — are, as a constitutional matter, to be enforced in 
suits against the individual state officials who violate federal law.19 
Clark has come forward with additional statements by the Framers 
that, in his view, establish that the Founders intended to deny the fed-
eral legislature the power to impose legal obligations on the states.  
Most of these additional statements, however, are equally consistent 
with the narrower proposition that the Founders contemplated that the 
federal obligations of the states would be enforceable only through 
suits against individual state officials.  Most of them establish that the 
Founders did not mean to establish a system in which the federal gov-
ernment could coerce the states as political bodies through suits 
against states.20  Because these statements focus on the methods of en-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 19 Id. at 1781–82. 
 20 Clark, supra note 1, at 1843–44 (quoting Letter from James Madison to George Washington 
(Apr. 16, 1787), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 344, 348 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901)); 
id. at 1844 (quoting James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 30, 1787), in 1 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 33, 34 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 
1937) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS]); id. at 1844–45 (quoting James Madison, Notes on the 
Constitutional Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra, at 47, 54); id. at 
1846 (quoting James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 16, 1787), in 1 FAR-
RAND’S RECORDS, supra, at 249, 255–56); id. at 1846 (quoting James Madison, Notes on the 
Constitutional Convention (June 18, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra, at 285); id. at 1847 
(quoting James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 19, 1787), in 1 FAR-
RAND’S RECORDS, supra, at 313, 320); id. at 1847 (quoting James Madison, Notes on the Consti-
tutional Convention (June 20, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra, at 335, 339–40); id. at 
1850 n.175 (quoting Edmund Randolph, Reasons for Not Signing the Constitution (1787), in 8 
DHRC, supra note 10, at 260, 266 (1988)); id. at 1854–55 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 
110 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); id. at 1855 (quoting THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra, at 116); id. at 1856 (quoting The Connecticut Convention 
(Jan. 4, 1788), in 3 DHRC, supra note 10, at 541, 546 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978) (statement of Wil-
liam Samuel Johnson)); id. at 1856–57 (quoting The Connecticut Convention (Jan. 7, 1788), in 3 
DHRC, supra note 10, at  541, 553–54 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978) (statement of Oliver Ellsworth)); 
id. at 1858 (quoting Francis Corbin, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 7, 1788), 
in 9 DHRC, supra note 10, at 1007, 1009 (1990)); id. at 1858 (quoting 9 DHRC, supra note 10, at 
1007, 1018 (1990) (statement of Edmund Randolph)); id. at 1859 (quoting John Marshall, Speech 
in the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 10, 1788), in 9 DHRC, supra note 10, at 1115, 1121 
(1990)); id. at 1859 n.223; id. at 1858 (quoting Robert R. Livingston, Speech in the New York Rat-
ifying Convention (June 19, 1788), in 22 DHRC, supra note 10, at 1682, 1686, 1687 (2008)); id. at 
1858 n.224 (quoting Robert R. Livingston, Speech in the New York Ratifying Convention (June 
23, 1788), in 22 DHRC, supra note 10, at 1809, 1809 (2008)); id. at 1860 (quoting Alexander Ham-
ilton, Speech in the New York Ratifying Convention (June 20, 1788), in 22 DHRC, supra note 10, 
at 1722, 1724–25 (2008)); id. at 1860–61 (quoting William Davie, Address to North Carolina Con-
vention (July 24, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 22); id. at 1861 (quoting 
James Iredell, Address to North Carolina Convention (July 28, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, 
supra note 10, at 146); id. at 1862 (quoting Samuel Spencer, Address to North Carolina Conven-
tion (July 29, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 163); id. at 1866 (quoting THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra, at 488); id. at 1867 (quoting George Mason, 
Address to the Virginia Convention (June 19, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 10, at 1403, 1406 
(1993)); id. at 1886 (quoting 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 146 (statement of James Ire-
dell)); id. at 1888 (quoting William Widgery’s Speech in the Massachusetts House of Representa-
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forcing federal law against the states, not on the applicability of federal 
law to the states as a substantive matter, they only support the nar-
rower claim that the federal obligations of the states must be enforced 
in suits between individuals (including suits against state officials).  
These statements, which are the most numerous of those that Clark 
cites, do not support Clark’s broader claim that the Framers under-
stood Congress to lack power to pass laws that operate on the states. 
Some of the statements cited by Clark do provide somewhat 
stronger support for the proposition that the Framers meant to deny 
the federal legislature the power to regulate the states themselves.  For 
a number of reasons, however, these statements fail to establish that 
there was general agreement among the Founders that the federal leg-
islature would lack the power to impose legal obligations on the states.  
As discussed below, even if these statements did unambiguously sup-
port Clark’s broader claim, they would at best show that some Fra-
mers held the view that Clark attributes to the Founders generally.  
Moreover, on closer inspection, many of these statements turn out to 
be ambiguous in relevant respects.  All told, the new evidence uncov-
ered by Clark fails to establish that the Founders as a whole held the 
view that Clark attributes to them. 
Perhaps the strongest support for Clark’s broader thesis comes 
from a colloquy at the Constitutional Convention relating to represen-
tation in the federal legislature.  According to Clark: 
In the course of a protracted and heated debate, a few delegates suggested 
that equal suffrage was appropriate because the government would some-
times act on states.  For example, William Davie remarked that “We were 
partly federal, partly national in our Union.  And he did not see why the 
Govt. might (not) in some respects operate on the States, in others on the 
people.”  Madison denied that the “Governt. would (in its operation) be 
partly federal, partly national.”  If true, the observation would favor the 
following compromise: “In all cases where the Genl. Governt. is to act on 
the people, let the people be represented and the votes be proportional.  In 
all cases where the Governt. is to act on the States as such, in like manner 
as Congs. now act on them, let the States be represented & the votes be 
equal.”  Madison, however, denied the premise underlying such a com-
promise.  “He called for a single instance in which the Genl. Govt. was not 
to operate on the people individually.”  In addition, he stressed that “[t]he 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
tives, INDEP. CHRON., Sept. 23, 1793, reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 427–29 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1994)); 
id. at 1889 (quoting Account of John Davis’s Speech in the Massachusetts House of Representa-
tives (Sept. 23, 1793), INDEP. CHRON., Oct. 7, 1793, reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, supra, at 433). 
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practicability of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for the States as po-
litical bodies, had been exploded on all hands.”21 
Statements like these support Clark’s broader claim insofar as they as-
sert that federal law was not expected to “act on” or “operate on” the 
states as states, but rather only on individuals.22 
Even if these statements did unequivocally support Clark’s broader 
claim, however, the statements are few and far between.  Given the 
numerous statements cited by Clark that support the narrower propo-
sition, the most that can be said is that some Framers understood that 
the federal government would not operate on the states as states.23  
Clark suggests that the Federalists’ claims at the ratifying conventions 
to the effect that the states would continue to enjoy immunity from 
suit are entitled to special weight because they were made by Federal-
ists to assuage the concerns of the Antifederalists regarding state su-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 21 Id. at 1848 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting James Madison, Notes on the 
Constitutional Convention (June 30, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 20, at 481, 
488; James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 14, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 20, at 2, 8; id. at 8–9; id. at 9). 
 22 See also id. at 1854 (“The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confede-
ration is in the principle of legislation for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or 
COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of whom they 
consist. . . . [W]e must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens — the only 
proper objects of government.” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra 
note 20, at 108–09) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 1855 (“[R]egulating individuals and 
enforcing such regulations through ‘the courts of justice’ would avoid the need . . . to rely on the 
‘exceptionable principle’ of ‘legislation for States’ . . . .” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 16 (Al-
exander Hamilton), supra note 20, at 116, 113)); id. at 1856 n.207 (“[A] legislation for communities, 
as contradistinguished from individuals, . . . is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity, by 
substituting violence in place of the mild and salutary coercion of the magistracy.” (alteration in 
original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 20 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 20, at 138) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); id. (“[I]f we are in earnest about giving the Union energy and dura-
tion we must abandon the vain project of legislating upon the States in their collective capacities.” 
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 20, at 154) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)); id. at 1857 (“[L]aws to be effective . . . must not be laid on states, but upon 
individuals.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Massachusetts Convention Debates (Jan. 21, 
1788), in 6 DHRC, supra note 10, at 1282, 1285 (2000) (statement of Rufus King))); id. at 1857 
n.211; id. at 1861 & n.236 (“[T]he Convention [was convinced] to depart from that solecism in pol-
itics — the principle of legislation for states in their political capacities.” (quoting William Davie, 
Address to North Carolina Convention (July 24, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, 
at 22) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 23 Indeed, the outcome of the colloquy quoted above leaves it ambiguous whether the other 
delegates agreed with the statements by Madison on which Clark relies.  The Convention, of 
course, settled on a compromise in which one of the houses of Congress would be chosen through 
equal representation of the states.  It is also worth noting that Justice Wilson, himself a Founder, 
expressly affirmed in Chisholm that the federal government possessed the power to enact laws 
operative on states.  See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 464 (1793) (opinion of Wilson, 
J.).  Although, in light of the subsequent adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, Justice Wilson’s 
opinion is properly discounted today insofar as it concludes that states can be sued, the opinion 
remains relevant as an indication of the lack of consensus among the Founders on whether federal 
laws could operate on states. 
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ability.24  But insofar as the statements cited by Clark suggest that the 
federal legislature would lack the power to regulate the states, they go 
well beyond providing the sought-for assurance.  Thus, even if the 
statements regarding sovereign immunity were entitled to special 
weight,25 the statements regarding lack of legislative power would not 
be. 
More importantly, many of the statements cited by Clark are, on 
closer inspection, ambiguous regarding the choice between the narrow-
er and the broader claim.  Some of the statements assert that the new 
Union would differ from the old in that the federal government would 
for the first time act upon individuals.26  These statements do not nec-
essarily suggest that the federal government would not also act upon 
the states.  Other statements indicate that the federal government 
would not operate on states as states.27  This does not necessarily mean 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 24 See Clark, supra note 1, at 1894–95. 
 25 For a skeptical view on whether similar assurances (on a different point) deserve special 
weight in the interpretive enterprise, see Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99  
COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2163–68 (1999). 
 26 See Clark, supra note 1, at 1845 (“Under the existing Confederacy, Congs. represent the 
States not the people of the States: their acts operate on the States not on the individuals.  The 
case will be changed in the new plan of Govt.” (quoting James Madison, Notes on the Constitu-
tional Convention (June 6, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 20, at 132, 133 (state-
ment of George Mason)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 1846 (“[T]he Virginia Plan ‘de-
parts itself from the federal idea, as understood by some, since it is to operate eventually on 
individuals.’” (quoting James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 18, 1787), 
in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 20, at 282, 283 (statement of Alexander Hamilton))); id. at 
1859 (“[T]he radical vice in the old confederation is, that the laws of the Union apply only to 
States in their corporate capacity.” (quoting Alexander Hamilton, Speech in the New York Ratify-
ing Convention (June 20, 1788), in 22 DHRC, supra note 10, at 1722, 1723 (2008)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)); id. at 1860 (“It is admitted that the powers of the general government ought 
to operate upon individuals to a certain degree.  How far the powers should extend, and in what 
cases to individuals is the question.” (quoting Melancton Smith, Address to New York Convention 
(June 21, 1788), in 22 DHRC, supra note 10, at 1748 (2008))); id. at 1860 (“Another radical vice in 
the old system, which was necessary to be corrected . . . was, that it legislated on states, instead of 
individuals . . . .” (quoting William Davie, Address to North Carolina Convention (July 24, 1788), 
in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 21–22)); See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, supra 
note 20, at 105 (“[W]e must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens” (em-
phasis added)). 
 27 Id. at 1852 (“Hence was embraced the alternative of a Government which instead of operat-
ing, on the States, should operate without their intervention on the individuals composing 
them . . . .” (emphasis added) (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 
1787), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 20, at 131, 131–32)); id. at 1858 (“[T]he necessity of 
having a government which should at once operate upon the people, and not upon the states, was 
conceived to be indispensible by every delegation present.” (emphasis added) (quoting 4 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES, supra note 10, at 256 (statement of Charles Pinckney)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); id. at 1861 (“[T]he government was not to operate against states, but against individuals.” 
(emphasis added) (quoting Samuel Spencer, Address to North Carolina Convention (July 29, 
1788), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 163)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 
1900 & n.483 (“[T]he Constitution ‘embraced the alternative of a Government which instead of 
operating, on the States, should operate without their intervention on the individuals composing 
them.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 
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that federal laws would not operate on states.  These speakers may 
have just been asserting that the federal government would lack the 
power to enforce federal laws in suits or other coercive acts directed 
against the states as collective bodies, as opposed to their officials.  
Other statements make the compound assertion that federal laws 
would not operate on states and be enforceable against them.28  These 
statements are consistent with the view that federal laws would oper-
ate on the states and be enforceable only against state officials.  Some 
of the statements are themselves qualified, leaving open the possibility 
that the federal government or federal laws could operate on the states 
in some circumstances.29  Finally, many of the statements merely ques-
tioned the wisdom or effectiveness of legislating for states and accord-
ingly may reflect an intent to leave the decision to Congress.30 
Clark himself ultimately appears to agree that the statements he 
cites are consistent with the narrower claim that the federal obligations 
of the states were understood to be enforceable only in suits between 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
1787), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 20, at 131, 132)).  See also colloquy quoted supra p. 
85 (“He called for a single instance in which the Genl. Govt. was not to operate on the people in-
dividually.”). 
 28 For example, as cited above, Madison stated at the Convention that “[t]he practicability of 
making laws, with coercive sanctions, for the States as political bodies, had been exploded on all 
hands.”  James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 14, 1787), in 2 FAR-
RAND’S RECORDS, supra note 20, at 9.  This leaves open the possibility of making laws operative 
on states but lacking coercive sanctions for the states (as opposed to state officials).  Similarly, 
Hamilton in Federalist No. 16 “dismiss[ed] as idle and visionary any scheme which aims at regu-
lating [the] movements [of states] by laws to operate on them in their collective capacities and to 
be executed by a coercion applicable to them in the same capacities.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 16, 
at 111 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).  This view leaves open the possibility 
that federal laws might operate on the states in their collective capacities and be executed by 
coercion applicable to state officials in their individual capacities. 
 29 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 1, at 1874 (“[T]he national government ‘in its ordinary and most 
essential proceedings’ would operate ‘on the individual citizens . . . in their individual capacities,’ 
rather than ‘on the political bodies composing the Confederacy, in their political capacities.’” (em-
phasis added) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), supra note 20, at 245)); id. at 
1883 (“The powers of the general Government . . . do for the most part (if not wholly) affect indi-
viduals, and not States . . . .” (emphasis added) (quoting Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 
435 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.))); id. at 1884–85 (stating that federal laws should operate on in-
dividuals and not states “except in the peculiar instance of a Controversy between 2 or more States 
& perhaps one or two other instances.” (emphasis added) (quoting James Iredell’s Observations on 
“This great Constitutional Question” (Feb. 18, 1793), in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, supra note 20, at 190)). 
 30 See id. at 1855 (“[R]egulating individuals and enforcing such regulations through ‘the courts 
of justice’ would avoid the need . . . to rely on the ‘exceptionable principle’ of ‘legislation for 
States’ . . . .” (footnotes omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 16, supra note 20, at 111, 108)); 
id. at 1857 (“[L]aws to be effective . . . must not be laid on states, but upon individuals.” (second 
alteration in original) (quoting Massachusetts Convention Debates (Jan. 21, 1788), in 6 DHRC, 
supra note 10, at 1287)); id. at 1848 (“The practicability of making laws, with coercive sanctions, 
for the States as political bodies, had been exploded on all hands.” (quoting James Madison, Notes 
on the Constitutional Convention (July 14, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 20,  
at 9)). 
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individuals (including suits against state officials).  After discussing the 
debates at the Philadelphia convention, including the colloquy quoted 
above, Clark considers whether his claim is contradicted by the fact 
that the Constitution itself clearly contains provisions operative on the 
states.  He writes: 
  If these prohibitions could be enforced only through coercive suits 
against states, then Article I, Section 10 would contradict Madison’s re-
peated assertions that the Constitution neither conferred nor required 
coercive power over states.  This apparent contradiction disappears, how-
ever, if these prohibitions could be effectively enforced either by suits be-
tween individuals (including suits against state officers) or through the as-
sertion of federal defenses in suits initiated by states.  The Founders were 
familiar with these mechanisms, and reliance on such indirect means of 
enforcement was consistent with background notions of sovereign immuni-
ty and the Founders’ decision to avoid reliance on federal power to coerce 
states.31 
If Clark is saying here that the mechanism the Founders contemplated 
for enforcing the constitutional obligations of the states was consistent 
with all of the Founders’ statements that he cites, then he is conceding 
that these statements say no more than that the federal obligations 
operative on states would be enforced only through officer suits (which 
is the narrower claim).  If Clark is saying that the officer-liability re-
gime is consistent with only one of the Founders’ claims (that is, that 
the federal government would lack coercive power against the states), 
then he has failed to dispel the “apparent contradiction” between their 
other statements and the plain text of the Constitution, which includes 
provisions that clearly operate on the states.32 
Clark may seek to dispel this remaining contradiction by claiming 
that, although the Founders imposed certain obligations directly on the 
states, they meant to deny the federal government the power to impose 
additional obligations on them.  But this claim falls apart when one 
considers that the Constitution itself expressly invalidates state laws 
that conflict with federal statutes.  By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, 
all federal enactments operate on the states by nullifying any conflict-
ing state laws, an aspect of federal statutes that today is commonly en-
forced in suits against state officers.33  In addition, as Clark recognizes, 
treaties of the United States clearly operate on the states as states.  
Clark convincingly argues that the Founders did not contemplate that 
the obligations imposed by treaties could be enforced in suits against 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 31 Id. at 1850–51. 
 32 See provisions cited supra p. 80. 
 33 See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1989). 
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the states.34  The dismissal of William Vassall’s suit against Massachu-
setts after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment is evidence that 
the Eleventh Amendment was not intended to permit suits against the 
states arising under treaties.35  But Clark does not deny that the treaty 
on which Vassall relied, the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, oper-
ated on the states when it, for example, prohibited future confisca-
tions.36  Clark’s own discussion of treaties thus contradicts any claim 
that the Founders meant to deny the federal government the power to 
create legal obligations operative on the states as states and supports 
instead the narrower proposition that the federal obligations of the 
states were intended to be enforceable only in suits between private 
individuals or against state officials. 
Clark might claim instead that the Founders meant to deny the 
federal government the power to impose affirmative obligations on the 
states, as distinguished from the negative obligation not to enforce 
state laws that conflict with federal statutes or treaties.  But the line 
between affirmative and negative obligations has not been easy to 
draw in related contexts.37  I do not claim here that such a line cannot 
feasibly be drawn.  My point is merely that the claim that the Found-
ers envisioned such a line is unsupported by the evidence that Clark 
offers.  Reading an affirmative-negative distinction into the Founders’ 
occasional statements that the federal government or federal law 
would not operate on the states as political bodies would be a far 
greater stretch of the Founders’ language than interpreting those 
statements as claiming that enforcement of the federal obligations of 
the states, whether based on the Constitution, statutes, or treaties, 
would be accomplished through suits against state officials rather than 
against the states themselves.  This is not to say that the federal power 
to impose obligations on states is unlimited; it is merely to say that the 
limits are not illuminated by the statements about the nature of the 
Union that Clark brings to our attention. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Bradford Clark has uncovered valuable additional sup-
port for the narrow claim that the Founders understood that the feder-
al legal obligations of the states would be enforceable only in suits  
between individuals (including actions against state officers).  The 
point is important in showing that sovereign immunity does not pre-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 34 Accord Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties and the Eleventh Amendment, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 
713, 715 (2002). 
 35 See Clark, supra note 1, at 1894. 
 36 Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. VI, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.  
 37 See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1317, 1344–45 (1999). 
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vent the judicial enforcement of the legal obligations of the states.  As 
an explanation of the particular wording of the Eleventh Amendment,  
however, Clark’s thesis does not get us much further than the current  
Supreme Court majority’s explanation based on state sovereign  
immunity. 
Clark’s broader claim that the Founders meant to deny the federal 
government the power to impose obligations on the states as states, for 
its part, does not get us any further in understanding the Eleventh 
Amendment’s text than does his narrower thesis.  The broader thesis 
does have significant implications for the scope of Congress’s power to 
enact legislation operative on the states as states, but Clark’s evidence 
fails to make out his broader claim.  Most of the new evidence that 
Clark brings to our attention supports only the narrower thesis or is 
ambiguous as between the narrower and the broader theses.  The rest 
of the evidence cannot be said to establish that the Founders generally 
agreed on the broader thesis.  In sum, Clark’s evidence for the broader 
proposition can and should be read to support instead the narrower 
claim on which he and I agree. 
